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This paper surveys recent literature on the design of international institutions and applies 
the  insights  from  it  to  the  prospects  for  regional  economic  cooperation  in  the  Asia-
Pacific. The political and economic heterogeneity of the region has served the process of 
regional  economic  integration.  But  this  heterogeneity  has  limited  the  extent  of  
institutional  development  and  contributed  to  well-known  features  of  it,  including  a 
proliferation  of  competing  institutions,  consensus  decision-making,  "shallow" 
cooperation, and limited delegation to  standing international secretariats. Changes in 
voting  rules  could,  in  principle,  change  these  outcomes  but  are  not  likely  to  arise. 
Deepening  cooperation  will  come,  rather,  from  marginal  changes  in  the  extent  of 
delegation. Several proposals are suggested about how this might occur, including more 
independent sources of information on regional trends,  enhanced dispute settlement, 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In  the  last  two  decades,  a  new  research  program  has  emerged  on  the  study  of 
international institutions. Its premise is simple: international organizations can be studied 
using the same analytic tools that have been used to study institutions in comparative 
politics and political economy.
1 This paper draws on this literature to understand the 
evolution of regional institutions in East Asia, the political limits on these institutions, and 
how  changes  in  institutional  design  might  help  generate  more  robust  economic 
cooperation.  
 
At the outset, it is important to specify some stylized facts: the features of the institutional 
landscape we seek to explain. Although the economic crisis of 2008/09 constitutes a 
potential stimulus for institutional innovation, its impact can only be evaluated against the 
backdrop of existing arrangements, some of them very longstanding.  
 
For many years, a dominant puzzle was the relative paucity of regional institutions in the 
Asia–Pacific when compared either to Europe (e.g., Kahler 2000, Katzenstein 2005) or 
even the Western Hemisphere (Haggard 1997, Ravenhill 2007, and Solingen 2008, for a 
comparison to the Middle East). This characterization is no longer accurate. Indeed, the 
opposite problem now seems more pressing. The region has witnessed an explosion of 
institution-building  that  has  produced  overlapping  arrangements.  At  least  five  distinct 
institutional ―complexes‖ can be distinguished:
2 
  
  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),  including  the  ASEAN  Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) and the recent commitment to create an ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC);  
  ASEAN+3 (APT) and its associated economic institutions, such as the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI), but also the collateral development of multilateral ties among 
the  Northeast  Asian  partners  (People‘s  Republic  of  China  [PRC],  Japan,  and 
Republic of Korea) through the Trilateral Summits;  
  East Asian Summit, currently including APT as well as India, Australia, and New 
Zealand, but with (potentially) open accession rules;  
  Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which remains the most significant 
trans-Pacific institution; 
  The multiplicity of overlapping regional trade arrangements (Aggarwal and Urata 
2006, Dent 2006, Suominen 2009, Ravenhill 2010), most of which are bilateral. 
                                                 
1  Among the more important general statements of this research agenda are an early review by Martin 
and Simmons (1998) and collective research projects on legalization and world politics (Goldstein et al. 
2000), on the rational design of international institutions (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001 and 2003) 
and on delegation and agency in international organizations (Hawkins et al. 2006, and Bradley and Kelly 
2008). Keohane (1984) is probably the most important progenitor.  
2  This paper does not address the growing number of institutions forged by subnational governments, 
such as growth triangles and growth corridors, nor the myriad specialized functional bodies in the region, 
such as the Mekong River Commission, Executives' Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks, 
Asian–Pacific  Postal  Union.  However,  an  important  issue  for  consideration  is  the  role  that  such 
specialized bodies might play in implementing initiatives forged by the more central inter-governmental 
organizations.    
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These in turn can be broken down into clusters depending on the partners setting 
their substantive and procedural agendas (e.g., United States [US]-led, PRC-led, 
Japan-led).  However,  new  multilateral  regional  trade  arrangements  have  also 
emerged in recent years, most notably the PRC–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). 
 
These  five  institutional  complexes  do  not  have  common  memberships,  substantive 
agendas,  or  decision-making  procedures.  The  existence  of  such  overlapping 
organizations requires that we consider not only the governance of each institution, but 
how and why tasks are allocated across them. Are these institutions complementary or 
competing? If institutions are competing, which ones appear to be ―winning‖?  
 
Despite  the  proliferation  of  institutions,  a  second  stylized  fact  is  that  many  of  these 
organizations seem shallow or thin, and in several senses: 
   
  The  agendas  of  regional  institutions  often  appear  quite  expansive,  even 
exhaustively so. But on closer inspection, the range of issues on which they are 
capable of forging joint action is often quite limited.  
  Institutions  operate  on  the  basis  of  consensus  decision-making  procedures, 
which  push  toward  modest  lowest-common-denominator  agendas  and 
agreements.  
  Commitments are non-binding, voluntary, and in some cases simply imprecise.  
  The extent of delegation to standing international secretariats or bureaucracies is 
tightly circumscribed and such institutions enjoy little independence. 
 
This characterization is also partly misleading; the region has seen ongoing efforts to 
finesse consensus decision rules, strengthen commitments, and expand delegation. The 
global economic crisis also appeared to spur new initiatives with respect to financial 
cooperation. But skeptics have more than a grain of truth in their favor. Despite the 
obvious  economic  success  of  the  region,  and  the  significance  of  the  Chiang  Mai 
Initiative,  the  proliferation  of  institutions  has  not  been  matched  by  formal  economic 
cooperation that is particularly robust. 
 
Section I provides an overview of the simple models of cooperation and delegation that 
undergird the new institutionalist literature. These models highlight how the extent of 
cooperation and delegation is limited by the heterogeneity of the membership. They also 
cast light on the crucial tradeoff between the widening of institutions by including new 
members  and  the  prospects  for  deepening  through  more  robust  forms  of  economic 
cooperation.  
 
Section II takes these models to the historical record, showing the extraordinary difficulty 
countries in the region have had in deepening regional institutions. ASEAN has played a 
crucial role in this regard, exercising political influence that far outstrips its economic 
weight. Rather, institutional innovation has come largely by widening existing institutions, 
but in the process also replicating their liabilities.  
 
The drawbacks of the ―ASEAN way‖ are widely recognized in the region, and a number 
of  strategies  have  been  pursued  to  finesse  it  by  empowering  smaller  groups,  either  
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inside existing institutions (variable speed geometries) or through creation of altogether 
new institutions (convergence clubs). Section III addresses these strategies, and argues 
that neither has proven particularly effective at deepening cooperation. Variable-speed 
geometries  have  had  difficulty  generating  commitments  that  are  both  variable  and 
precise. The creation of smaller convergence clubs such as FTAs permits, in principle, 
more intensive cooperation. As a matter of logic, however, it is not necessarily the case 
that  these  FTAs  reflect  a  push  toward  deeper  cooperation.  Rather,  they  reflect  the 
diverse interests of the countries negotiating them. As a result, they pose increasing 
coordination problems and will prove difficult to subsume under a more encompassing 
organization.  
 
Efforts  to  change  the  design  of  regional  institutions  must  ultimately  look  at  two  key 
questions: (i) how interests will be represented, including through voting rules; and (ii) 
the extent to which tasks are delegated. These questions are addressed in Sections IV 
and  V,  respectively.  There  is  some  evidence  of  efforts  to  finesse  the  constraints  of 
consensus decision-making at the margin, particularly when redistributive transfers or 
lending are involved. Nonetheless, it appears highly unlikely that countries in the region 
would  move  from  consensus  procedures  toward  either  weighted  voting  or  more 
majoritarian decision-making rules.  
 
Given the substantial differences in political systems across the region, it is also highly 
unlikely that we will see direct representation of citizens through regional parliaments. 
But  mechanisms  are  emerging  through  which  some  non-governmental  actors  are 
represented,  most  notably  business  associations;  these  connections  might  be  used 
more aggressively to discipline the process of economic cooperation.    
 
Section V explores the logic of delegation. There is ample evidence of delegation in East 
Asian institutions, but most of it occurs from one inter-governmental body to another or 
to purely ad hoc structures. Two core problems are apparent, one having to do with the 
principals,  the  other  with  the  agents.  First,  there  is  a  mismatch  between  the  stated 
economic objectives of many of the core institutions in the region and the dominant 
influence exercised by foreign ministries. A crucial reform is to strengthen the role of 
inter-governmental bodies made up of ministers of finance, economy, and trade, as well 
as central bankers; such initiatives are already bearing fruit.  
 
The second problem is that the extent of delegation to standing secretariats remains 
limited, with little history of delegation for the purposes of surveillance, monitoring of 
compliance, dispute resolution, and other judicial functions. In considering what types of 
delegation  would  be  both  feasible  and  effective,  this  paper  focuses  on  several  core 
problems in existing regional institutions and make three suggestions.  
 
First,  there  is  a  strong  need  for  more  independent  information  that  will  support 
monitoring, surveillance, and assessment of what individual countries and institutions 
have  done.  There  is  also  a  need  for  more  outside  checks  on  information  provided 
through the inter-governmental process, either through business groups or academics. 
The creation of compliance boards and other peer review mechanisms and the initiation 
of institutional assessment projects are means through which such information might be 
generated.   
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Second, regional integration efforts, whether bilateral (as in many FTAs) or multilateral 
(e.g., AFTA) need more robust dispute settlement procedures that will incentivize firms 
to be more actively engaged in pushing regional integration forward at the policy level. 
One way of achieving this objective would be to explore granting direct standing to firms 
in dispute settlement procedures rather than relying solely on governments.   
 
Finally, more attention needs to be paid to the use of transfers as a means of securing 
more  flexible  decision-making  processes,  more  binding  commitments,  and  greater 
delegation.  To date, this approach has been rejected by the richer countries in the 
region,  but  regional  integration  funds  could  provide  an  institutional  mechanism  to 
combine transfers with closer monitoring of national policy commitments.  
 
In terms of the locus of these reform efforts, the sheer breadth of APEC suggests that 
cooperation  through  that  venue  would  yield  the  largest  gains.  However,  institutional 
innovation  is  possible  at  all  levels,  from  FTAs  through  ASEAN  and  up  to  the  most 
encompassing regional institutions: APEC, the EAS, and APT. 
 
 
2.  A Simple Model of Cooperation and Delegation through 
International Institutions 
 
The explanations for the stylized fact of relatively weak institutions range from culture 
(Acharya 2000 and 2009), to historical animosities and nationalism (Rozman 2004, Shin 
and Sneider 2007), the legacies of the Cold War (Ikenberry and Moon 2008, Aggarwal 
and  Koo  2008),  and  the  emergence  of  new  geostrategic  rivalries  centered  on  the 
relationship  between  the  US,  PRC,  and  Japan  (Green  and  Gill  2009).  Others  have 
argued that the very economic success of the region—in effect, integration through other 
means—has either mitigated the demand for inter-governmental institutions (Katzenstein 
2005) or alternatively made institutions more robust than in other developing regions 
(Solingen 2008).  
 
Yet  in  the  simple  analytic  framework  of  the  new  institutionalism,  the  most  obvious 
constraint on institutionalization is the extraordinary heterogeneity of the countries of the 
Pacific Rim. Among the more salient differences across countries have been alliance 
commitments, level of development, the nature of economic systems, and development 
strategies and regime type. Table 1 outlines these differences and notes some of their 
predicted effects and examples from the region‘s institutional history. For our purposes, 
the most important effect of this heterogeneity is that preferences vary with respect to a 
range of economic policies, including—but by no means limited to—the willingness to 
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Table 1: Structural and Preference Heterogeneity: Consequences for Cooperation 
 




  Alliance commitments limit the 
significance of multilateral security 
arrangements  
  Tendency for multilateral security 
institutions to mirror alliance 
commitments 
  Persistence of San Francisco 
system. 
  Creation of SEATO, Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, and 
expansive bilateralism, such as 
TCOG and TSD 
  Limited institutionalization of 
Northeast Asia 
  Lowest-common-denominator 
quality of multilateral security 
arrangements, including ARF and 
the Six Party Talks. 
Level of 
development 
  Conflicts over financing of 
institutional initiatives 
  Divergent expectations about extent 
and terms of redistribution through 
international institutions 
  Conflicts over provision of, access to, 
and rules governing pooled liquidity 
  Limited funding for trade facilitation 
and Ecotech through APEC 
  Continued link of CMI to IMF 
conditionality and move toward 





preferences for  
liberalization 
  Conflicts over scope and pace of 
liberalization  
  Conflicts over mechanisms for 
assuring compliance 
  Variable speed geometry of ASEAN 
FTA 
  FTAs not conforming with 
GATT/WTO Article XXIV 
commitments 
  Difficulty in enforcing and monitoring 
APEC Bogor commitments; 
Individual Action Plan approach 
  Failure of EVSL 
Regime type    Limits on direct representation 
(regional parliament) and 
representation for NGOs 
  Limited role for multilateral or 
regional courts 
  Conflicts over democracy and human 
rights agendas  
  Delay in the PRC‘s entry into APEC 
following Tiananmen 
  Intra-ASEAN conflicts over Myanmar 
  Ongoing difficulties in integrating the 
Democratic  People‘s Republic of 
Korea into regional institutions 
 
List  of  acronyms:  APEC,  Asia  Pacific  Regional  Cooperation;  ARF,  ASEAN  Regional  Forum;  ASEAN,  Association  of 
Southeast Asian Nations; ASEAN FTA, ASEAN Free Trade Agreement; CMI, Chiang Mai Initiative; EVSL, Early Voluntary 
Sectoral  Liberalization;  GATT/WTO,  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade/World  Trade  Organization;  IMF, 
International Monetary Fund; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; TCOG, Trilateral Coordination and Oversight 
Group (United States, Republic of Korea and Japan); TSD, Trilateral Security Dialogue (United States, Australia and 
Japan) 
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The effects of divergent preferences can be clarified by considering a simple spatial 
model of cooperation (see Nielson and Tierney 2003; Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 2006; 
Hawkins et al. 2006; Epstein and O‘Halloran 2008). An emerging theoretical literature 
motivated by the European Union is also useful in clarifying the tradeoff between the 
widening  and  deepening  of  institutions  (Alesina,  Angeloni  and  Etro  2005;  Hausken, 
Mattli and Plumper 2006; Berglof et al. 2008). 
 
Countries  join  international  organizations  because  they  provide  public  goods  with 
positive externalities; these might take the form of mutual security assurances, access to 
pooled financial resources, free trade, or the harmonization of regulatory policies. An 
extremely  important  assumption  is  that  these  network  externalities  exhibit  increasing 
returns: the more members of an institution, the greater the benefits it can confer.  
 
Political scientists tend to model cooperation as a mutual adjustment of policies, which 
may or may not entail delegation or centralization. Economists, by contrast, consider the 
centralized provision of public goods financed by contributions from the members (e.g., 
Alesina,  Angeloni  and  Erto  2005).  Yet,  the  basic  insights  emanating  from  the  two 
literatures are quite similar. The loss of autonomy or sovereignty costs associated with 
membership is the extent to which the initial policies of members have to be adjusted 
upon entry into the institution. Institutions may place little demands on their members, 
meaning that policy moves very little or that the centralized provision of public goods is 
limited. Alternatively, entry into the institution may require members to move policy very 
dramatically  or  make  substantial  contributions  in  support  of  public  goods;  the  PRC‘s 
accession to the WTO is an important case in point.  
 
The extent of policy adjustment required may be variable within any given institution. To 
begin,  however,  it  is  assumed  that  accession  to  the  institution  commits  countries  to 
common policies; examples would be harmonization of customs procedures, an (Article-
XXIV-conforming)  FTA,  the  convergence  criteria  associated  with  European  monetary 
union, or a stipulated contribution to a common budget. In this simple model, countries 
calculate the anticipated network externalities from forming or joining an organization, 
which are contingent on the number of other parties joining, and weigh them against the 
sovereignty costs of adjusting the policy status quo. It can be shown formally that the 
propensity of organizations to form is endogenous to a number of parameters, including 
the benefits derived from the public good, the number of issues on which countries seek 
to cooperate, and the decision-making rules. A number of these issues are taken up in 
more detail below. But first, the focus is on the problem of preference heterogeneity.   
 
Organizations  are  more  likely  to  form  among  countries  with  similar  or  contiguous 
preferences. Countries with similar preferences can create an institution without having 
to move policies far from their stand-alone ideal points; those who want either more 
cooperation  (high-demanders)  or  less  (low-demanders),  by  contrast,  pay  high 
sovereignty costs and will find the institution unappealing.  
 
These distributional conflicts can be seen more clearly if we think about the formation of 
an institution that includes some but not all of the countries in a given region. How will 
the  insiders  to  this  institution  think  about  the  gains  from  enlargement  or  widening—
bringing  in  new  members—as  opposed to  deepening,  or  cooperating on  new  issues  
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among  themselves?  Bringing  in  more  countries  is  presumably  good  since  expanded 
membership increases the provision of the relevant public goods. However, it is easier to 
bring in countries with contiguous preferences than countries that are either high- or low-
demanders. High-demanders will threaten insiders with further policy adjustments if they 
are granted any decision-making influence after entry (see Alesina, Angeloni and Erto 
2005 for a treatment under majority voting rules). There are only three obvious ways for 
insiders to avoid this eventuality: 
  
(i)  stipulate ex ante that cooperation will be limited to the issues on which insiders 
agree, 
(ii) create  decision-making  rules  that  give  insiders  either  veto  power  over  new 
entrants or agenda control once they enter, 
(iii) change  the  nature  of  commitments  themselves  so  that  they  are  either  non-
binding or variable-speed. 
 
The  very  institutional  arrangements  designed  to  assure  that  insiders  will  exercise 
agenda  control  have  the  effect  of  making  the  institution  less  attractive  to  high-
demanders.  As  Epstein  and  O‘Halloran  (2008)  put  it,  the  limits  of  cooperation  are 
determined by the organization‘s ―biggest weakest link,‖ or the lowest-demand country 
that the members wish to include in the organization (Berglof et al. 2008). 
 
Low-demanders,  by  contrast,  pose  the  opposite  problem  of  threatening  to  dilute  the 
gains from the organization. This can only be managed in the context of a common rule 
institution by  
 
(i)  stipulating strict accession rules that require up-front policy adjustments;  
(ii) strong  monitoring,  compliance,  and  dispute-settlement  mechanisms,  including 
the threat of expulsion; and 
(iii) decision-making processes that guarantee agenda control to insiders.  
 
Hausken, Mattli and Plumper (2006) extend these simple ideas into a consideration of 
the tradeoffs between widening and deepening. Insiders are likely to choose deepening 
(on the issues of interest to them) when the number of regulations and policies awaiting 
harmonization  is  relatively  high  in  comparison  to  the  number  already  harmonized. 
Insiders are more likely to opt for deepening—again, on the issues of common interest to 
the  members—the  more  the  mean  preference  of  insiders  deviates  from  the  mean 
preference  of  outsiders  in  areas  likely  to  become  harmonized  in  the  future.  Again, 
insiders seek to avoid circumstances in which the admission of new entrants will shift the 
focus of the organization away from their (mean) preferences. 
 
These  simple  models  provide  some  insights  into  the  relationship  between  global 
multilateral institutions and regional ones. Why would regional institutions form when 
there are presumably greater gains to be had within the context of global ones (as can 
be  theoretically  demonstrated  most  easily  with  respect  to  trade)?  The  reasons  are 
twofold. First, although global institutions should in theory yield larger gains, preferences 
within those organizations are likely to be more heterogeneous. As a result, high- or low-
demanders  form  regional  institutions  because  they  are  more  in  line  with  their 
preferences. Regional organizations may be more robust in the extent of cooperation  
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(e.g., the US–[Republic of] Korea Free Trade Agreement compared with the WTO) or 
less (e.g., the conditions for drawing from the IMF compared with the proposed Asian 
Monetary Fund or Chiang Mai Initiative). Second, not only are preferences more closely 
aligned in regional groupings, but decision-making structures are more favorable to the 
members of the smaller grouping. 
 
 
3.  The Stylized Facts Revisited: Path Dependence in Asian 
Regionalism 
 
This very simple model provides a number of insights into the evolution of institutions in 
the region, as well as some core features of their design. Provided below is a brief 
overview  of  the  evolution  of  the  four  main  institutional  complexes  noted  in  the 
introduction—setting aside FTAs for the moment—which shows the substantial power 
wielded by ASEAN incumbents with respect to the regional architecture.  
 
The US did not opt for a multilateral approach to the provision of security in Northeast 
Asia,  on  top  of  which  multilateral  economic  institutions  such  as the  Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) might be built (Calder and Ye 2004). 
As a result, the most significant international institutions in the region were initially the 
bilateral alliance arrangements of the so-called San Francisco system, which were not 
simply  military  alliances,  but  included  substantial  economic  cooperation  as  well 
(Ikenberry    2001,  2003).
3  Cold  War  cleavages  blocked  even  the  consideration  of 
multilateral institutions among the major powers of Northeast Asia (the PRC, the Soviet 
Union, Republic of Korea, Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea, Japan, and the US) 
until  Gorbachev‘s  Vladivostok  speech  of  1986  and  the  gradual  embrace  of 
multilateralism on the part of the PRC that began in the mid-1990s (Goldstein 2005). Not 
until 1999, did a thin multilateral structure emerge linking the PRC, Republic of Korea, 




In Southeast Asia, similar Cold War cleavages limited the scope of regional cooperation. 
The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), although multilateral in design, did 
not provide the foundation for trans-Pacific multilateral economic cooperation between 
the  US  and  Southeast  Asia.  As  a  result,  ASEAN  (formed  in  1967)—and  ASEAN 
                                                 
3  These  were  with  Australia  (1951);  New  Zealand  (1951);  the  Philippines  (1951);  Republic  of  Korea 
(1953); Japan (1954); Thailand (1954); and Taipei,China (1954). A multilateral economic initiative led by 
Republic of Korea in 1966 to join these countries, as well as Malaysia and Viet Nam, was disbanded in 
1975.  
4  The Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among the PRC, Japan, and Republic 
of  Korea  (signed  in  2003,  available  at  http://www.aseansec.org/15284.htm)  makes  reference  to 
cooperation in trade and investment, and takes note of the output of a working group on a Northeast 
Asian FTA, but states only that ―the three countries will explore, in a timely manner, the direction of a 
closer future economic partnership among the three countries‖ and that they will ―launch an informal joint 
study  on  the  possible  modality  of  trilateral  investment  arrangements.‖  With  respect  to  financial 
cooperation,  Section  III  para.  6  appears  to  commit  to  cooperation  primarily  through  the  Chiang  Mai 
structures, which are discussed in more detail below.   
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procedures—came  to  exercise  a  very  important  influence  over  subsequent 
developments. Until some adjustments in the ASEAN Charter (signed in 2007), these 
included 
  
(i)  an  overwhelming  emphasis  on  inter-governmental—as  opposed  to 
supranational—bodies, with a weak Secretary General (nominated by member 
states  in  alphabetical  order  and  serving  a  5-year  term)  and  Secretariat  (only 
created in 1976, initially with a staff of only seven);  
(ii) consensus decision-making procedures; and
  
(iii) strong  norms  of  non-intervention,  or  non-interference,  which  were  typically 
interpreted to mean that compliance with joint initiatives was voluntary and non-
binding.  
 
Acharya (2009) traces carefully how these rules reflected very particular concerns about 
sovereignty costs, particularly given the newness of the countries in question. But these 
procedures also reflected the substantial heterogeneity within ASEAN itself, a problem 
that has continued to plague the institution (Ravenhill 2007, Jones and Smith 2007).  
 
In large part because of the weak institutionalization of Northeast Asia and the first-
mover  advantages  enjoyed  by  ASEAN,  much  institutional  development  in  Asia  has 
constituted either a ―widening of the ASEAN complex‖ or a response by high-demanders 
to the institutional deficiencies of it. ASEAN‘s influence was first revealed in the creation 
of APEC. After a very long negotiation, ASEAN conceded to the formation of the new, 
trans-Pacific institution, but insisted that it operate  according to ASEAN rules. In the 
words of the Seoul APEC Declaration in 1991:
5 
  
  4. Cooperation will be based on:  
a.  The principle of mutual benefit, taking into account the differences in the 
stages of economic development and in the sociopolitical systems, and 
giving due consideration to the needs of developing economies; and 
b.  A  commitment  to  open  dialogue  and  consensus-building,  with  equal 
respect for the views of all participants. 
  
5. APEC will operate through a process of consultation and exchange of views 
among high-level representatives of APEC economies… 
 
In  addition,  the  so-called  Kuching  Consensus  (reached  in  1990)  on  ASEAN‘s 
participation in APEC stipulated that APEC would not engage in formal negotiations that 
would  lead  to  binding  commitments  on  its  members,  a  perfect  example  of  agenda 
control. The APEC Secretariat, created in 1992, was if anything weaker than ASEAN‘s. 
Seconded  by  the  country  hosting  the  APEC  process  for  the  year,  the  Executive 
Director‘s  energies  were  devoted  primarily  to  making  sure  that  the  Leaders‘  and 
Ministerial meetings ran smoothly; institutional continuity at the top of the Secretariat 
was altogether lacking. 
 
                                                 
5  www.aseansec.org/1041.htm  
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The  Bogor  Declaration  of  1994  subsequently  stated  that  ―in  order  to  facilitate  and 
accelerate our cooperation, we agree that APEC economies that are ready to initiate and 
implement a cooperative arrangement may proceed to do so while those that are not yet 
ready to participate may join at a later date.‖ This statement of principle became the core 
of  the  Osaka  Action  Agenda  approach  from  1995.  However,  this  idea  of  a  flexible 
consensus clearly does not commit those who are ―not ready‖ to subsequently join in 
any common undertaking, and not until 2001 was there an effort to clarify a process 
through which the ―ready‖ could initiate and implement joint actions in the context of the 
institution.  
 
Consensus rules set in train a predictable set of conflicts within APEC between high- 
and low-demanders (Ravenhill 2001). These did not fall precisely along lines of level of 
development, as Japan sometimes occupied an ambiguous position. But Western (and 
essentially Anglo-Saxon) countries not only wanted to place greater  priority on trade 
liberalization,  but wanted to negotiate  binding agreements. The Bogor Declaration of 
1994 defied expectations by committing the organization to the ambitious—if temporally 
distant  and  two-speed—goal  of  ―free  and  open  trade  and  investment‖  by  2010  for 
industrialized countries and 2020 for developing ones. Yet subsequent developments 
revealed what could already be seen behind the scenes at Bogor: that the differences in 
preferences with respect to trade liberalization in APEC were too large to maintain the 
organization  as  a  single  undertaking.  The  Osaka  Action  Plan  of  1995  approach  to 
implementing the Bogor Declaration, with its combination of a broad agenda (15 policy 
areas),  voluntary  and  non-binding  Individual  Action  Plans  (concerted  unilateral 
liberalization) and weak Collective Action Plans, with voluntary participation, was not a 
strategic blunder on the part of Japan. Rather, it reflected the fundamental constraints of 
the membership and implicit rules of the organization. The failure of the Early Voluntary 
Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) initiative (Krauss 2004) made the same point even more 
forcefully.   
 
The  next  round  of  institutional  innovation—the  formation  of  the  ASEAN+3  (APT) 
structures—is often attributed to the critical juncture of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. 
The  leaders  of  the  PRC,  Japan,  and  Republic  of  Korea  were  invited  to  an  informal 
ASEAN leaders‘ meeting in December 1997, just as the US was being criticized for not 
responding to the crisis in a robust way (Stubbs 2002, Calder and Ye 2004, Aggarwal 
and Koo 2008). However, the origins of the APT are in fact much earlier, and can be 
found in a succession of selective widening efforts: ad hoc mechanisms through which 
ASEAN sought cooperation with important non-ASEAN members. These mechanisms 
included joint committees, dialogue partnerships, and the Post-Ministerial Conferences.
6 
Yet  the  founding  documents  of  the  APT—from  the  Joint  Statement  on  East  Asia 
Cooperation in 1999 to the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation in 2007—
are  clear  that  APT  procedures  would  essentially  mirror  ASEAN‘s.  Accession  rules 
                                                 
6  For example, the first formal dialogue with Japan was held in 1973, but following the ASEAN–Japan 
summit of 1977 a variety of channels formed. Republic of Korea was made a Sectoral Dialogue Partner 
in  1989  and  joint  committees  with  the  PRC  were  formed  as  early  as  1994.  The  ASEAN+3  Foreign 
Ministers met informally as early as 1994. The first joint meeting between ASEAN, the PRC, Japan, and 
Republic of Korea took place in the context of preparing for the ASEM.  
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retained significant discretion on the part of ASEAN,
7 and only ASEAN members could 
host APT meetings. 
 
At the third APT summit in 1999, the organization appointed a group of scholars to flesh 
out what a deeper East Asian community might look like (the East Asia Vision Group, or 
EAVG), followed by an inter-governmental East Asia Study Group (2002). The Study 
Group outlined an ambitious array of 17 short-term measures through which the APT 
process could be deepened. Yet, it also called for an East Asian Summit (EAS) and the 
creation of an East Asian community. In November 2004, ASEAN agreed to convene an 
EAS, adding India, Australia, and New Zealand to the ASEAN+3 structure.  
 
Even  though  outlined  as  a  longer-term  goal  that  would  result  from  ―an  evolutionary 
process that builds on the substantive comfort level of the existing ASEAN+3 framework 
(East Asia Study Group 2002),‖ the idea of an East Asian community immediately raised 
delicate issues of membership. Would the EAS come to subsume the APT? Would this 
further  widening  of  the  ASEAN  complex  ultimately  reach  across  the  Pacific  to  a 
membership  closer  to  APEC‘s,  which  in  addition  to  the  US  included  the  Russian 
Federation;  Taipei,China;  several  Latin  American  countries;  and  a  number  of  small 
Pacific island countries? Or would ASEAN and APT incumbents favor a more narrow 
membership that did not have to accommodate new entrants with widely divergent views 
and  a  necessary  dilution  of  their  influence?  It  quickly  became  clear  that  the  PRC 
preferred the membership of the APT to that of the EAS. As Wu Xinbo (2009) points out, 
the PRC believed that the purpose of including non-East Asian countries was to dilute 
Chinese influence, possibly at the behest of the US. By contrast, Japan has favored a 
more inclusive regional organization, perhaps even including the US. 
 
These conflicting preferences with respect to the core regional institutions were mirrored 
in competing proposals with respect to the membership in a regional FTA. The East Asia 
Study  Group  vetted  the  idea  of  an  East  Asia  Free  Trade  Area  and  an  East  Asian 
Investment Area presumably based on APT membership. In 2006, Japan proposed a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) that would mirror EAS 
membership.  At  the  2004  APEC  meeting  in  Santiago,  the  APEC  Business  Advisory 
Council (ABAC) proposed study of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), an 
idea that subsequently received support from a number of important advocates in the US 
and was formally proposed by the Bush administration (Dent 2008). Needless to say, 
these competing proposals have been impossible to reconcile and none has come to 
fruition. Rather, the trade agreement that seems most likely to expand is one that is not 
bound by a fixed membership, but which has an open accession clause—the TPP.
8  
 
                                                 
7  The delineation of accession rules to the EAS in 2005—on the part of ASEAN, it should be underlined—
appeared to hold open the door to wider membership by setting standards that could include not only 
India, Australia, and New Zealand, but even the United States and others. The criteria included close ties 
to ASEAN, signatory to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and status as an ASEAN dialogue 
partner.  
8  Signed by Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand, while Brunei Darussalam subsequently joined and a 
number of other countries have signaled their interest in negotiating accession, including the US (under 
the Bush administration), Australia, Viet Nam, and Peru.   
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Despite these differences with respect to membership, a common feature of all of these 
organizations is their commitment to ―the ASEAN way.‖ In the 2000s, however, criticisms 
started  to  mount  that  these  rules  were  retarding  cooperation;  the  result  has  been  a 
succession of institutional efforts seeking to finesse or circumvent them. 
 
 
4.  Finessing the ASEAN Way through Small Groups 
 
The models described in Section I assume that the organization in question is trying to 
coordinate  on  a  common  policy,  such  as  a  free  trade  agreement,  regulatory 
harmonization, or the budget contribution for the provision of a public good. However, an 
alternative  is  to  allow  or  encourage  smaller  groups  of  like-minded  states  to  form  a 
grouping,  either  within  existing  institutions  or  through  the  formation  of  ―convergence 
clubs.‖  Before  turning  to  these  alternatives,  it  is  worth  considering  a  more  rigorous 
defense of the ASEAN way and, in particular, its ―soft‖ conception of law.   
 
Hard and Soft Law 
 
Proponents of ―hard‖ law argue that both the precision of commitments and their binding 
status  are  crucial  for  those  commitments  to  be  credible.  Precise  and  binding 
commitments  are  a  necessary  condition  not  only  for  adjudication  and  third-party 
enforcement—and therefore to important forms of delegation and institution-building—
but even for reputational effects to operate as well. How can I tell if you have violated 
your commitments if they are non-binding or I cannot even be sure what they are?  
 
However, states may purposefully undertake commitments that are non-binding or even 
altogether  ambiguous.  Consider,  for  example,  the  following  passage  from  the  first 
ASEAN Concord of 1976: ―member states shall progress towards the establishment of 
preferential trading arrangements as a long term objective on a basis deemed to be at 
any particular time appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous 
agreement of member states.‖ This is a somewhat extreme case of ambiguity about 
basic objectives. Nonetheless, ASEAN did subsequently commit in 1992 to an AFTA 
process that subsequently  made  at  least  some  progress  toward  the freeing  of  inter-
regional trade (Nesadurai 2003).  
 
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the possible benefits of soft 
law. Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that soft law lowers sovereignty costs and therefore 
increases the prospects for compromise and the reaching agreements; this is arguably 
self-evident. However, Gersen and Posner (2008) also note that non-binding statements 
―can ultimately have real effect by working their way into customary international law or 
by providing the framework for informal inter-state cooperation.‖ The passage of soft law 
resolutions can signal future intent; when leaders pass even non-binding resolutions with 
respect to trade, they are signaling to important domestic audiences the future direction 
of policy. At the same time, soft law resolutions might elicit information from affected 
agents at a lower cost, and thus help policymakers learn about the consequences of 
their actions in contexts characterized by substantial uncertainty.  
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There are good reasons for skepticism with respect to the merits of soft law, at least in 
the Asia–Pacific context. First, the positive effects of soft law depend heavily on the 
credibility of the institutions generating it. Many of the examples cited by Gerson and 
Posner  involve  the  passage  of  non-binding  resolutions  by  the  US  Congress,  which 
clearly is capable of also passing binding ones. The proliferation of multiple soft law 
resolutions—as in both the Osaka Action Agenda and the ASEAN AEC—dilutes their 
signaling effect and thus an institution‘s credibility. Moreover, proponents of hard law are 
obviously  correct  about  the  implications  of  non-binding  commitments  for  institutional 
development, a topic addressed in more detail below. If commitments are ambiguous, it 
is  not  clear  what  function  monitoring  or  adjudicative  bodies  would  serve.  Soft  law 
appears to be a cause as much as an effect of institutional weakness in the region.  
 
Variable Speed Geometries 
 
Is it possible to introduce discipline under soft law? One way of doing so is through 
―variable speed geometries.‖ Institutions can permit tiered commitments that conform 
more closely to the preferences of the actors. At least in principle, a variable speed 
geometry  approach  can  entail  precise  commitments;  they  are  simply  differential. 
Nesadurai (2003) outlines an example from the AFTA. In the mid-1990s, governments 
began to backtrack on commitments to liberalization, which were not initially binding. 
Negotiations ensued, through which original targets were relaxed to accommodate the 
interests of critical sectors, thus securing political support for the larger project. But the 
negotiations also produced quite precise, albeit variable-speed, targets.
9 
 
The new ASEAN Charter institutionalizes the ―ASEAN-x‖ concept, but this concept is 
decidedly  looser.  Under  ASEAN-x,  ―flexible‖  participation  in  economic  agreements  is 
allowed ―if there is a consensus to do so‖ (ASEAN Charter Art. 21 para. 2); note the 
ambiguity over whether such flexible participation would ultimately include binding, even 
if  variable,  commitments.  The  Singapore–Thailand  Enhanced  Economic  Relationship 
(STEER) framework, launched formally in 2003, rested on a similar logic (labeled by 
Singapore‘s  Minister  for  Trade  and  Industry  ―2  plus  x.‖).  Within  APEC,  the  2001 
Shanghai  Leaders‘  meeting  formally  endorsed  the  ―pathfinder‖  approach,  which  also 
permits initiatives to move forward among clubs of interested parties.  
 
But there is some reason to doubt whether these various formulae should be considered 
variable-speed geometries at all. Under a variable-speed geometry framework, countries 
undertake  a  common  commitment  but  implement  at  different  speeds.  The  formulae 
discussed above entail commitments on the part of some that will not necessarily be 
undertaken by others.  
 
Variable-speed  geometries  obviously  involve  some  important  tradeoffs.  At  least  in 
principle, the limited success of these efforts was not a function of the variable-speed 
nature of the commitments, but the broader problem that commitments were not seen as 
binding.  However,  some  difficulties  do  appear  to  arise  when  actors  are  variably 
                                                 
9  See the Protocol on the Special Arrangement for Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products, 30 September 
1999, Articles II through V. As Ravenhill (2007) notes, not all of these commitments were subsequently 
kept.   
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committed.  First,  low-demanders  will  have  incentives  to  overestimate  the  difficulty  in 
meeting stipulated goals. This is particularly so if there are benefits from free-riding on 
the actions of high-demanders. At the limit, the variable speeds look little different than 
what would have occurred in the absence of any agreement (Ravenhill 2007).  
 
In principle, the institutional architecture of organizations with variable-speed geometries 
also need not be thin; within ASEAN, for example, the recommendations of the High 
Level  Task  Force  on  ASEAN  Economic  Integration  argued  for  flexibility  in  meeting 
commitments, but at the same time proposed that commitments be more precise and 
transparent. The Task Force also called for the creation of an ASEAN Compliance Body 
and a strengthened Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ―ensure expeditious and legally 
binding decision in resolving trade disputes.‖ But low-demanders may seek to weaken 
the institution through each of these avenues as well by (i) arguing for commitments that 
are  not  only  flexible  but  imprecise  and  non-binding;  and  (ii)  opposing  independent 
information-gathering, monitoring, and dispute-settlement or judicial functions.   
 
Convergence Clubs: Misreading the FTAs 
 
A  third  solution  to  the  lowest-common-denominator  problem  is  to  forge  agreements 
among  countries  whose  preferences  are  more  closely  aligned.    Such  ―convergence 
clubs‖ are presumably characterized not only by higher levels of cooperation, but more 
robust institutional arrangements as well.  
 
One strategic reason for the formation of such clubs is that the revealed benefits of 
cooperation and delegation will induce low-demanders to reassess their stand-alone or 
alternative-institutional ideal points, thus creating cascading agreements pushing toward 
freer trade (Baldwin 1997).
10 Such an outcome is certainly possible; the interest of other 
countries in joining the TPP, which began as an agreement between Singapore, New 
Zealand, and Chile, might prove exemplary.  
 
However, given weak multilateral disciplines on the formation of FTAs, it is important to 
note that clubs need not converge on higher levels of cooperation; they only need to 
constitute an equilibrium for their members. This more cautious assessment seems to 
more accurately capture the diversity of recent FTAs in the region. National initiatives 
followed national templates and accommodated the interests of the parties (Dent 2006, 
Aggarwal and Urata 2006, Hufbauer and Schott 2007).  
 
Nor is it plausible that institutions that are incapable of generating common agendas and 
institutions in the first place will be able to reconcile or incorporate these divergent clubs 
once they have formed. To the contrary, the existence of path dependencies is amply 
apparent.  At  the  APEC  Ministerial  Meeting  in  Santiago  in  2004,  member  countries 
agreed  to  develop  a  set  of  non-binding  best  practice  guidelines  for  FTAs,  and  the 
Committee  on  Trade  and  Investment  (CTI)  subsequently  produced  several  model 
                                                 
10  This  later  might  occur  either  ―positively,‖  as  the  benefits  of  membership  are  revealed  (learning),  or 
―negatively,‖  if  the  formation  of  the  convergence  club  actually  lowers  the  welfare  of  non-members 
(discrimination). The pursuit of ―high-quality‖ FTAs by the United States and the Bush administration‘s 
strategy of competitive liberalization self-consciously pursued this logic.   
The Organizational Architecture of the Asia–Pacific: Insights from the New Institutionalism  |       15 
 
chapters covering institutional arrangements such as dispute settlement and accession 
rules. However, the APEC standards mirrored US agreements, and as a result were 
unlikely to have any significant effect  on either existing or future FTAs among  other 
parties. Moreover, some of the suggestions, such as simplified rules of origin and open 
accession  rules,  would  undermine  the  very  political  foundations  on  which  existing 
agreements rested. As Hufbauer and Schott (2007) put it succinctly mirroring the logic 
described above: ―member countries almost always resist gratuitous entry by ‗outsiders,‘ 




The foregoing institutional solutions to diversity modulate the nature of commitments, 
membership, and decision-making rules. An alternative to these solutions is to maintain 
the  insistence  on  a  common  undertaking  with  respect  to  the  given  dimension  of 
commitment  (e.g.,  trade  liberalization  or  regulatory  harmonization),  but  to  offset  the 
sovereignty  costs  of  the  low-demanders  with  sidepayments.  The  most  direct  way  of 
doing  this  is  through  transfers  or  joint  policies  with  a  redistributive  component. 
Redistributive bargains, including in the form of direct transfers (e.g., regional policy, 
agricultural supports), have arguably been pivotal to maintaining the European common 
market as a single undertaking. This solution requires a willingness and ability of the 
high-demanders to affect such transfers through the international institution, which will in 
turn depend on the perceived benefit of concessions from the low-demanders along the 
―primary‖ dimension of cooperation.  
 
The  use  of  sidepayments  to  achieve  cooperation  and  delegation  appear  to  be 
underappreciated in East Asia. The Initiative for Asian Integration (IAI) of 2000, aimed 
primarily at the new entrants (Cambodia, Lao People‘s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, 
and Viet Nam, or [CLMV]), represents a modest redistributive program tied loosely to the 
AFTA. Arguably, the entirety of ECOTECH constitutes a channel for such redistribution 
through  APEC,  and  is  repeatedly  justified  as  a  necessary  complement  to  the  TILF 
agenda.  
 
There are several reasons why such transfers have been limited in the Asia–Pacific. The 
first is a classic sequencing, or chicken-and-egg, problem; the incentives to redistribute 
for the purpose of securing binding commitments is diminished in institutions that have 
not managed to make binding commitments. Yet governance issues may also matter; 
that  those  financing  such  transfers—namely  the  richer  countries—will  be  more 
comfortable only where they can be assured of exercising appropriate influence in the 




5.  Decision-Making: Representation and Voting in 
International Organizations 
 
Voting rules can influence outcomes by enfranchising different coalitions of actors and 
thus  changing  the  choices  international  organizations  make.  But  since  members  are  
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forward looking, voting rules are also dependent on the composition and preferences of 
the membership; as a result, there are good reasons to be skeptical that formal changes 
in rules—many of which are only implicit—are likely to resolve the problems outlined in 
the previous section. Nonetheless, we can at least identify the menu of choices and note 
the conditions under which alternative decision-making procedures have arisen. It is also 




The most inclusive voting rule is a requirement for unanimity or consensus. Technically, 
all countries in such a system have veto power and they are sometimes called ―unit veto‖ 
systems as a result. However, such a system does not require unanimous support—in 
effect,  a  yes  vote  by  all—to  undertake  an  initiative.  All  that  is  required  is  that  the 
proposal avoids a veto. Former ASEAN Secretary General Severino is worth quoting at 
length on this point:  
 
Consensus  on  a  proposal  is  reached  when  enough members  support  it—six, 
seven, eight or nine, no document specifies how many—even when one or more 
have misgivings about it, but do not feel strongly enough about the issue to block 
action on it. Not all need to agree explicitly. A consensus is blocked only when 
one or more members perceive the proposal to be sufficiently injurious to their 
national interests for them to oppose it outright. 
 
As we have seen,  the formal (or typically the informal) structure of most  multilateral 
institutions in East Asia conforms to this procedure.
11  
 
If  unit  vetoes  are  likely  to  be  associated  as  both  cause  and  effect  with  shallower 
cooperation and less delegation, the opposite is not necessarily the case; that more 
majoritarian  voting  systems  would  be  associated  with  higher  levels  of  cooperation. 
Powerful (and richer) states  are not likely to submit themselves to binding decisions 
taken  by  simple  majority  rule;  weaker  and  poorer  states  would  engage  in  excessive 
redistribution.  The  rich  and  powerful  will  either  limit  the  agenda  on  which  majority 
decision-making takes place, insist on voting rules that preserve their influence, such as 
weighted voting or the exercise of vetoes, or exit into convergence clubs in which they 
do not face such risks.   
 
There are a variety of ways to split the difference between consensus rules on the one 
hand  and  simple  majority  rule  on  the  other;  these  include  qualified  majority  or 
supermajority  rules,  weighted  voting,  and  granting  vetoes  to  powerful  members 
outright.
12 Although it seems highly unlikely that any of the major institutions in the region 
                                                 
11  Maggi and Morelli (2006) argue that unanimity decision-making may be superior in the absence of third-
party enforcement because decisions are self-enforcing. Once states agree on a particular policy there 
should be no incentive to deviate from it; if there were, the dissenting state would have blocked the 
adoption  of  the  policy  in  the  first  place.  However,  as  already  outlined,  such  decision-making  also 
empowers the ―low-demanders‖; higher compliance is bought at the cost of ―shallower‖ cooperation. 
12  The international financial institutions combine weighted voting with supermajority voting that effectively 
grants vetoes to the US and advanced industrial states on some decisions. The UN Security Council is  
The Organizational Architecture of the Asia–Pacific: Insights from the New Institutionalism  |       17 
 
would explicitly move toward qualified majority voting, there is at least some evidence of 
efforts to finesse the constraints of consensus decision-making.  
   
The most interesting of these is the case of the multilateralization of the CMI. Since 
2004,  the  APT‘s  review  of  the  CMI  has  resulted  in  some  of  the  most  significant 
institutional developments in the region (Kawai and Houser 2007, Grimes 2009, Henning 
2009). In May 2007, the finance ministers agreed in principle to a self-managed reserve 
pooling  arrangement  governed  by  a  single  contractual  arrangement;  the  subsequent 
negotiations centered on both substantive and procedural issues, including the decision-
making around swap activation and the structure and process of surveillance. In May 
2009, the Finance Ministers announced agreement on ―all aspects‖ of CMIM. Despite 
this announcement, many features of the agreement remained unclear. Nonetheless, 
agreement  on  the  allocation  of  contributions  to  the  newly-created  pool  appeared  to 
equate  to  weights  for  voting  purposes,  which  were  described  as  follows:  ―the 
fundamental issues will be decided through consensus of members of ASEAN+3, while 
the lending issues will be decided through majority.‖ It is not clear whether this majority 
would  be  a  simple  or  qualified  majority;  the  PRC  and  Japan  hold  32%  each,  while 
Republic of Korea holds a 16% share. A 70% threshold would give the PRC and Japan 
vetoes, depending of course on basic votes. But if the major contributors retain the right 
to opt out of contributing to a loan package, members might settle for a lower activation 
threshold, or even a simple majority. However the details ultimately evolve, it appears 
that the CMIM process has produced a significant institutional innovation in the region in 
the form of weighted voting. It is also noteworthy that such weighted voting has emerged 
in the same sort of institutions in which it prevails elsewhere, namely, those in which it is 
important to accommodate the interests of creditors. 
 
The  ―pathfinder‖  approach  within  APEC—discussed  briefly  above  in  the  context  of 
variable speed geometries—might also be seen as an alternative voting rule. Pathfinder 
initiatives  require  a  full  consensus  for  initial  approval  but  permit  initiatives  to  move 
forward with support from only 25% of the membership. As of August 2008, a total of 
nine  pathfinder  initiatives  had  been  launched  in  such  diverse  areas  as  food  mutual 
recognition  arrangements,  data  privacy,  and  corporate  governance,  with  all  but  one 
spearheaded by the advanced industrial states in APEC (including Singapore). Yet this 
interpretation of the pathfinder language in the Shanghai Declaration would technically 
still allow a veto over the initiative even if parties chose to abstain from joining (Feinberg 
2003).  Since  the  pathfinder  initiatives  do  not  commit  other  parties  to  join  (―…these 
initiatives should…encourage the broadest participation by other APEC members when 




The discussion so far has focused entirely on the representation of states. What are the 
prospects for wider-ranging modes of representation?  
                                                                                                                                                 
the classic case of granting a limited number of parties vetoes; majorities are required for UN Security 
Council decisions, but majorities that include all of the Permanent 5 (or at least their abstention). 
Super-majority voting models are one way to mitigate these risks by requiring larger but not unanimous 
coalitions that include powerful members.  
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If there is a ―democratic deficit‖ in Europe, it is a yawning chasm in Asia where there has 
to date been relatively little discussion of direct voter input or control over international 
institutions  through  elected  regional  parliaments.  Again,  the  reason  for  strong  inter-
governmental  bias  is  fairly  obvious.  The  heterogeneity  of  political  systems,  and  the 
persistence of authoritarian rule in a number of major countries in the region, is likely to 
block the evolution of direct voter representation at the multilateral level. It is also likely 
to block the creation of courts in which individuals would have direct standing. 
  
The potential for a more active NGO or private advisory role in international institutions is 
a more intriguing possibility. For reasons already noted, institutionalized representation 
of many civil society groups in Asia is likely to be blocked for political reasons or tightly 
circumscribed. For example, tripartism would have to accommodate official unions. The 
groups  most  likely  to  gain  representation  are  business  groups,  such  as  the  APEC 
Business Advisory Council (ABAC). The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), 
formed in 1980, is an even earlier progenitor. Private interests can influence agendas 
and  also  serve  as  monitors  by  providing  alternative  sources  of  information  on 
organizational  performance.  To  see  how  such  monitoring  might  work  requires 
consideration of the broader issue of delegation in international institutions. 
 
 
6.  The Varieties of Delegation 
 
Delegation is a conditional grant of authority to an independent body to make decisions 
and  take  actions  (Lake  2007,  Bradley  and  Kelly  2008).  Given  that  the  weakness  of 
standing  secretariats  is  a  leitmotif  of  the  literature  on  Asian  institutions,  it  is  worth 
outlining the logic of delegation in some detail, starting with those forms of delegation 
that have the least binding effect on the policy positions of the principals and moving 
towards those that place harder constraints on governments (Bradley and Kelly 2008). 
Before  doing  so,  however,  it  is  important  to  make  some  observations  about  the 
organizational characteristics of the ―agent,‖ since these bodies can be of very different 
sorts.  
 
If we take the peak council of country members—the inter-governmental structure—as 
the principal, we typically think of an executive, secretariat, commission, or bureaucracy 
as the key agent; the extent of delegation to secretariats defines the extent of delegation 
within a given international institution. However, secretariats are only one body to which 
principals can delegate. Adjudicative bodies—courts, panels, arbitration committees—
play a crucial role in resolving disputes and enforcing compliance. Moreover, principals 
can  delegate  to  a  variety  of  other  entities  as  well,  including  outside  experts,  other 
international institutions (as has been the case in the CMI‘s reliance on the IMF) and 
sub-groupings of the principals themselves.  
 
This last form of delegation—from one inter-governmental body to another—is by far the 
most significant form of delegation in Asia‘s international institutions. Inter-governmental 
structures can range in composition from the highly political summits among heads of 
state, which have been an enduring feature of both ASEAN and APEC, to meetings of 
foreign ministers and their subordinates (e.g., high-level official or ministerial meetings),  
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to  meetings  of  trade,  finance,  and  other  functional  ministers,  down  through  various 
working-level inter-governmental bodies.  
 
From the perspective of furthering the goal of economic cooperation, the composition of 
the  principals  is  important  for  what  can  get  done.  There  is  in  fact  a  very  important 
mismatch between the composition of the controlling bodies of key regional institutions 
and  their  stated  objectives.  Ministries  of  foreign  affairs  do  not  have  influence  over 
economic policy. Nor do they have the connections with interested private sector parties 
required to make credible commitments with respect to policy.  
 
A crucial institutional innovation in the region may lie as much in the creation of new 
bodies of principals as in proposals for new bureaucratic agents. Two examples make 
the point. First, the influence of the APT structure over economic cooperation in the 
region  rests  heavily  on  the  creation  of  the  APT  Finance  Ministers  meetings,  which 
commenced in 2000. This pivotal body bears responsibility for a number of significant 
initiatives, including the CMI, the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, and the APT Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue. A core institutional reform in the ASEAN Charter is the 
delegation  of  responsibility  for  implementation  of  the  ASEAN  Economic  Community 
(AEC)  blueprints  to  the  ASEAN  Economic  Ministers  (AEM),  through  the  newly 
established Council of ASEAN Economic Community. This body in turn has authority to 
delegate further to relevant functional ministerial bodies as well as to the Secretariat. A 
core institutional test of the AEC is whether these newly-formed bodies will prove as 
innovative for ASEAN as the meetings of finance ministers have proven for the APT.  
 
Information Gathering and Agenda Setting 
 
The core of delegation resides in the gains from an (institutional) division of labor: the 
principal delegates authority to a specialized agent with the expertise, resources, and 
mandate to perform the given task. Probably the least risky form of delegation is a grant 
of  research  and  advice  authority,  under  which  a  specialized  body  or  committee  is 
granted the resources to conduct research and gather information on a topic.  
 
A variant of this form of delegation centers on agenda-setting. Principals recognize that 
they are incapable of reaching decisions, for example, as a result of socially intransitive 
preferences or cycling. In East Asia, the question of leadership can also be sensitive; the 
countries that are natural agenda-setters, including the PRC, Japan, and the US, may 
face risks in assuming that role. As a result, inter-governmental bodies have delegated 
to an outside body not simply to gather information but to set an agenda by proposing 
policies. 
 
East Asian institutions have undertaken a lot of ―research and advice‖ delegation, and it 
is precisely the basis for the critique that these institutions are ―talk shops.‖ The array of 
bodies that take this form runs into the hundreds, from working-level intergovernmental 
meetings to highly specialized consultative bodies of experts; many of these operate on 
an ad hoc basis. Bodies of highly-visible policy intellectuals have also played important 
agenda-setting roles in the institutional development of all of the core bodies outlined 
here, including ASEAN, the APT, EAS, and APEC, and have typically been formed in 
advance of the negotiation of significant FTAs (e.g., the [Republic of] Korea–Japan FTA  
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Joint Study Group met for years). There have also recently been efforts to establish 
somewhat more enduring research and analytic capacities, for example, in the newly-
established  Economic  Research  Institute  for  ASEAN  and  East  Asia  (ERIA)  and  its 
flagship Deepening Economic Integration (DEI) project. 
 
This  sort  of  grant  of  authority  for  information  and  research  or  agenda-setting  is  by 
definition  non-binding,  and  precisely  for  that  reason  it  has  generated  substantial 
skepticism. However, the logic of such delegation is much more complex than it may 
appear at first blush, since as in any delegation relationship policy experts may well have 
preferences that diverge from those of the principals. Lake (2007) outlines the dynamics 
of such informational delegation through a simple model in  which the advisory body 
proposes policies that the principals can then either accept or reject. In the simple model 
of  cooperation,  states  make  choices  about  the  extent  of  cooperation  based  on  an 
assessment of the net benefits. Research and information gathering could in principle 
change those calculations, for example, by revealing the extent of negative externalities 
(e.g.,  trans-border  effects  of  pollution  such  as  acid  rain)  or  positive  ones  (e.g.,  the 
precise extent of gains from trade or financial cooperation).  
 
For such delegation to lead to increased cooperation, however, three conditions must 
pertain. First, the principals must be able to gauge whether the agents‘ proposals are 
superior  to  the  status  quo  (the  knowledge  condition).  Second,  the  agents  need 
incentives to make proposals that are superior to the status quo. Satisfying this condition 
can be tricky in settings where preferences of the principals are heterogeneous. Ex ante, 
both the choice of issues on which to delegate and the identity of the agents themselves 
are subject to political compromises among the principals; as a result, high-powered 
advisory  bodies  often  do  little  more  than  recreate  the  heterogeneity  among  the 
principals.  The  most  famous  regional  example  of  this  sort  were  the  well-known 
disagreements among APEC‘s Eminent Persons Group on ―open regionalism.‖
13 A third 
condition for increased cooperation is that the body of principals is capable of taking 
Pareto-improving  decisions  in  the  face  of  new  information,  which  is  obviously  more 
difficult in the face of the consensus decision rules.  
 
To  date,  there  has  been  virtually  no  research  on  the  extent  to  which  this  form  of 
delegation  has  had  an  effect  in  the  Asia–Pacific.  A  further  deficiency  of  these 
information-gathering, research, and agenda-setting bodies is that they tend to be ad 
hoc,  which  increases  the  control  of  the  principals  but  weakens  their  impact.  More 
importantly,  there  has  been  little  if  any  delegation  for  the  purpose  of  independent 
assessment of whether cooperative initiatives have had the stipulated effects. ASEAN 
does not devote resources to serious study of the AFTA and its effects that could inform 
internal discussions; the surprise among ASEAN capitals at the highly skeptical 2003 
McKinsey  Consulting  report  of  ASEAN‘s  progress  was  testimony  to  the  absence  of 
critical internal assessment. APEC does not study whether commitments reported under 
its trade and investment facilitation initiatives are in any way additional to what countries 
were already doing. And although the signing of FTAs is typically proceeded by quite 
                                                 
13  The differences centered on the American representative‘s preference for a more standard FTA versus 
the concept of ―open regionalism,‖ under which concessions extended under the APEC process would 
be extended unilaterally beyond the region on a most-favored nation (MFN) basis.    
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detailed analytic work on the potential gains from trade, there is much less research ex 
post on whether these agreements have had any effect.  
   
Implementation: Do Things Get Done in Asian Institutions?  
 
A major reason why Asia is seen as thinly institutionalized centers on the absence of 
standing secretariats engaged in the direct implementation of projects. In theory, such 
delegation  is  most  likely  in  issue  areas  in  which  there  are  informational  and 
organizational  economies  of  scale  and  in  which  tasks  are  frequent,  repetitive,  and 
require specific expertise. The most obvious example of this sort of delegation are the 
international  financial  institutions,  which  exhibit  both  organizational  and  political 
advantages over national agencies in extending and monitoring conditional lending and 
other forms of assistance. The emergence of the CMI suggests that it is precisely in this 
area where the most substantial capacity to implement is emerging.  
 
Outside of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), however, there is little delegation of this 
sort in the Asia–Pacific, and ADB itself has only recently been exploited as a possible 
implementing body for decisions taken in other forums. The reasons for this reticence 
appear  to  be  both  financial  and  programmatic.  In  organizations  such  as  ASEAN, 
financial resources were scarce when the organization was founded and the capacity to 
pool and redistribute resources limited. Since that time, ASEAN has been hamstrung by 
budget rules that require equal contributions from all members, despite the fact that per 
capita incomes have diverged immensely (partly as a result of the accessions of the 
1990s). As a result, the ASEAN Secretariat has a staff of only 60.  
 
Within the institutions that encompass both developed and developing countries, such 
as APEC, the developed countries have been reluctant to commit financial resources. 
The result has been a fragmented and ad hoc implementation process, in which donors 
lead and finance initiatives they deem of interest but do not commit resources to the 
organization as a whole. 
 
In addition to the financial constraints on delegation, principals may feel that they would 
lose control if too much power were delegated. This concern is exaggerated, in part 
because the line between the inter-governmental and supranational spheres is not as 
sharp as is often thought. An important example is the system of ―comitology‖ within the 
EU (Joerges and Neyer 1997, Bradley 1997, Scott and Trubeck 2002). Although the 
Commission has primary responsibility for the implementation of Community initiatives, it 
is assisted by a dense network of committees made up of representatives from member 
states. These committees enable the Commission to establish dialogue with national 
administrations before adopting implementing measures, and to adjust those measures 






                                                 
14  In  2006,  an  important  constitutional  change  established  closer  Parliamentary  oversight  over  the 
comitology system.  




Regulation  constitutes  a  further  level  of  delegation  from  implementing  projects,  and 
entails  grants  of  authority  to  standing  institutions  that  ―create  administrative  rules  to 
implement,  fill  gaps  in,  or  interpret  preexisting  international  obligations  (Bradley  and 
Kelly 2008, 14). The extent of such delegation is a function in the first instance of binding 
and  uniform  law,  which  is  largely  absent  in  East  Asia.  However,  as  the  comitology 
structure in Europe demonstrates, such a process need not be—indeed cannot be—
separated from participation by member states. Some of the more purely advisory and 
ad  hoc  bodies  that  currently  exist  in  organizations  such  as  ASEAN  could  be 
subordinated to such a process of regulatory development were the decision taken to 
develop  a  more  permanent  secretariat  or  commission  structure;  the  development  of 
common standards provides an important example. The AEC currently constitutes the 
most likely test of this proposition, but similar regulatory functions could emerge out of 
the  current  APT  projects,  which  include  areas  as  narrow  as  the  harmonization  of 
industrial  statistics  up  through  the  Asian  Bond  Market  Initiative,  which  has  its  own 





An  important  reason  for  delegating  to  international  institutions  is  to  increase  the 
credibility of commitments and to ―lock-in‖ cooperative policy positions in the national 
arena.  This  can  only  occur  by  raising  the  costs  of  reneging.  Compliance  can  be 
enhanced  in  two  main  ways:  (i)  by  granting  parties  the  right  to  take  violations  of 
commitments  to  an  independent  third-party  dispute  settlement  mechanism,  or  (ii)  by 
allowing the international institution to play a more direct monitoring and enforcement 
role.  
 
Dispute  settlement  in  the  four  main  regional  institutions  appears  weak,  but  this  is 
somewhat misleading. An important feature of recent FTAs has been the inclusion of 
dispute settlement mechanisms. ASEAN adopted a dispute settlement protocol in 1996 
and an ―enhanced‖ dispute settlement mechanism in 2004. This latter protocol is much 
more legalized and covers a range of inter-ASEAN agreements, going beyond trade to 
other functional protocols. To date, there has been little research on the use of these 
mechanisms in the region, which appear to be limited. Nonetheless, from an institutional 
perspective, stronger dispute settlement mechanisms could in fact have wide-ranging 
implications for all aspects of the decision-making process.   
 
The strength of dispute settlement depends in the first instance on the extent of uniform, 
precise, and binding law, discussed above in the consideration of hard and soft law. In 
any  area  of  cooperation  where  there  are  incentives  to  behave  opportunistically  by 
                                                 
15  Working Group 1 (WG1) has responsibility for research on ways to increase the supply of local currency 
denominated  bonds;  WG2  studies  the  business  model  of  a  new  credit  guarantee  and  investment 
mechanism for the region; WG3 focuses on a possible regional clearing and settlement mechanism and 
impediments  to  cross-border  bond  investment  and  issuance;  and WG4  prepares  Asian  credit  rating 
agencies for Basel II implementation fundamentals. Each of these could result in joint bodies focusing on 
greater intra-regional regulatory harmonization.   
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reneging on commitments, or ―defecting,‖ the existence of clear statute has the benefit of 
increasing  the  probability  of  detection  and  bringing  national  law  into  conformity  with 
international  obligations.  Soft  law  weakens  both  precision  and  the  binding  nature  of 
commitments,  and  thus  also  has  the  effect  of  weakening  possible  means  of 
enforcement.  
 
Smith  (2000)  provides  a  useful  introduction  to  the  menu  of  choices  with  respect  to 
dispute  settlement  mechanisms,  and  shows  that  the  extent  of  delegation  to  dispute 
settlement mechanisms can be harder or softer as well:  
 
  Disputes  can  be  handled  by  consultation,  mediation,  and  arbitration,  or 
institutions can permit recourse to an independent third party in the form of a 
panel or court.  
  If there is third-party review, rulings can be binding on the parties or they can be 
subject to effective ex post revision or even veto by further formal or informal 
political processes.  
  Some judicial bodies are ad hoc, and arguably weaker as a result, while others 
are  standing  bodies,  with  independence  guaranteed  through  standard 
mechanisms (e.g., terms of appointment, independent budgets).  
  The  question  of  standing  is  a  particularly  interesting  area  of  institutional 
development. Historically, only states have had standing; cases are brought by 
countries against countries. But this process is arguably less efficient since it 
introduces an additional hurdle through which an aggrieved party—ultimately a 
firm—must  jump.  Direct  legal  standing—the  right  of  firms  to  bring  cases—
strengthens the force of law because of the high-powered incentives firms have 
to seek redress.  
  Finally, there is the issue of remedies, which may range from measures that are 
legally binding in national law to those that are negotiable ex post. 
 
A striking feature of new FTAs is the inclusion of quite elaborate dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  If we set aside the FTAs, the most  important institutional innovations 
have taken place in ASEAN. As envisioned by the High Level Task Force on Economic 
Integration  (HLTF),  the new  system  was  to  comprise  an  advisory,  consultative,  and 
adjudicatory mechanism in addition to a revised ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism. 
The HLTF proposed the creation of an ASEAN Legal Unit, the ASEAN Consultation to 
Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT); the ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body 
(ACMB), or ASEAN Compliance Board (ACB); as well as an enhanced ASEAN dispute 
settlement  mechanism  (DSM).  The  actual  Protocol  on  the  Enhanced  DSM  of  2004 
proved a surprisingly weak instrument, however. On the surface, the new DSM looked 
very  similar  to  the  WTO  mechanism,  showing  many  features  of  a  highly  legalized 
system,  including  the  standard  mechanism  of  consultations,  terms  for  establishing 
independent panels, and an appeal process. However, on closer inspection, the Senior 
Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM)—a key inter-governmental body—plays a central 
role  in  the  process.  Like  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  process,  the  2004  Protocol 
adopted  the  negative  consensus  rule.  Panels  for  disputes  are  convened  upon  the 
request by the complainant party unless there is a consensus finding by the SEOM not 
to  do  so.  Since  the  complainant  parties  are  unlikely  ever  to  vote  against  a  panel‘s 
establishment, the process should be virtually automatic. However, the SEOM‘s more  
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general rules of procedure are consensual and firms do not have independent standing, 
meaning  that  governments  socialized  to  a  highly  consensual  inter-governmental 
process have to confront one another in an arena where other forms of cooperation are 
presumably  being  sought.  Not  surprisingly,  the  process  has  not  been  viewed  as 
complainant-friendly and it appears to have gotten very little—if any—use.  
 
Credibility and Lock-In: Delegation for Monitoring and Enforcement 
 
In principal, members of an international institution can allow the international body not 
only to monitor commitments but to enforce them as well. The European Commission 
has the authority to initiate proceedings before the European Court if it has reason to 
believe  that  a  member  state  is  failing  to  fulfill  an  obligation  under  EU  law.  (Such 
proceedings may also be started by another EU member country). 
 
That such measures are still a long way from consideration in East Asia would appear to 
go  without  saying  given  the  absence  of  binding  commitments,  strong  executive 
organizations, or adjudicative bodies capable of rendering binding judgments. However, 
there  have  been  marginal  steps  to  strengthen  monitoring  and  surveillance.  Two 
examples can be mentioned. The first is the evolution of the peer review process in 
APEC.
16 The core of the Osaka process is the Individual Action Plan (IAPs). However, 
there has been no mechanism to guarantee that the IAPs are in any way substantively 
additional to what countries are already doing. In conjunction with the mid-term stock-
taking  of  progress  towards  the  Bogor  Goals  in  2005,  APEC  strengthened  the  peer 
review process. These changes included the establishment of a time-table for the review 
of all 21 member economies. Prior peer reviews, which began at the second Senior 
Officials Meeting in 1997, were voluntary and ad hoc with no fixed schedule. The new 
peer review process also allows the review team to explore issues not listed explicitly in 
the IAPs, albeit with the agreement of the reviewed party. Most importantly in terms of 
process, the new peer review adds a second outside expert and has been scheduled to 
coincide with the Senior Officials Meeting, which increases the probability that there is 
outside monitoring of commitments. This process in no way guarantees more robust 
collective action. Nonetheless, its ―naming and shaming‖ function could be strengthened 
by institutionalizing participation by business groups in the evaluation process.  
 
A second example of monitoring and surveillance are the emergent institutions of the 
APT. ASEAN+3 finance and central bank deputies hold 2-day meetings semiannually. At 
the  Economic  Review  and  Policy  Dialogue,  ministers  exchange  views.  At  present, 
external experts and ADB staff provide general input, but assessment and evaluation of 
performance and policy in any given country appears to be the domain of the country‘s 
minister. There is no peer review process. But given the consensus-driven culture of 
APT organizations, even the introduction of inter-governmental peer review would be 
less compelling than introducing formal participation from outside parties, whether from 
the ADB, independent economists, the private sector, or even independent panels. 
 
 
                                                 
16  See  IAP  Peer  Reviews:  APEC  Members  Make  Progress.  APEC  Newsletter.  March  2007. 
http://www.apec.org/apec/enewsletter/mar_vol12/onlinenewsa.html  
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7.  Conclusion 
 
Whatever  its  advantages  with  respect  to  economic  integration,  the  political  and 
economic heterogeneity of the countries of the Pacific Rim has posed challenges to the 
governance  of  regional  institutions.  Until  the  2000s,  the  dominant  institutions  in  the 
region—initially  ASEAN  and  APEC—managed  this  diversity  through  consensus 
decision-making,  the  absence  of  binding  commitments,  and  correspondingly  weak 
monitoring and adjudicative functions. Governments were also reluctant to delegate any 
significant authority to standing secretariats; international organizations had little role in 
setting  agendas,  implementing  collective  initiatives,  or  monitoring  and  assessing 
performance.  In  combination,  these  institutional  arrangements  fundamentally  limited 
what  institutions  could  achieve.  It  has  been  hard  to  demonstrate  that  regional 
institutions—rather  than  multilateral  ones  or  the  unilateral  choices  of  governments—
have contributed substantially to the tremendous growth and economic integration of the 
region.  
 
Since  these  initial  institutions  were  set  in  place,  there  have  been  several  efforts  at 
institutional reform of existing institutions. Variable speed geometries have been made 
explicit,  but  these  have  not  generated  commitments  that  were  simultaneously  both 
variable and hard. Nor did pathfinder efforts in APEC and ASEAN produce as many 
followers as was initially anticipated. More fundamental institutional reforms of existing 
institutions, such as qualified majority voting, did not even come up for discussion.  
 
The most important institutional reform governing the inter-governmental process has 
not had to do with decision-making rules but with the composition of inter-governmental 
bodies.  The  creation  of  the  APT  Finance  Ministers  meeting,  and  hopefully  the  new 
structures  for  the  ASEAN  Economic  Community,  empower  ministries  that  are  more 
capable of making binding decisions. Even marginal increases in the staffing of these 
inter-governmental bodies would be a step forward. 
 
Rather than reform of existing institutions, institutional innovation in the region has come 
largely  through  the  creation  of  altogether  new  institutions.  The  adjustment  of 
memberships  has  proved  more  significant  than  the  adjustment  of  rules.  Two 
developments in this regard have proven noteworthy: (i) the multiplication of FTAs, and 
(ii) the emergence of the APT as the institutional core of the regional integration process.  
 
The proliferation of FTAs may well reflect the domino theory of liberalization advanced 
by Baldwin (2011), but from a governance perspective overlapping institutions create 
numerous coordination problems. Some of these new organizations reflect disaffection 
with  existing  institutions,  both  at  the  multilateral  (WTO)  and  regional  levels  (APEC, 
AFTA). It is revealing that a number of APEC and ASEAN members are willing to make 
concessions that go far beyond what these organizations have managed to achieve. As 
argued  above,  however,  convergence  clubs  need  not  mark  a  decisive  move  toward 
deeper  levels  of  cooperation  since  they  may  be  formed  among  low  demanders;  the 
PRC–ASEAN  agreement  arguably  constitutes  an  example.  A  major  institutional 
challenge  for  the  region  is  whether  these  efforts  can  be  reconciled  through  a  more 
encompassing agreement that would accomplish three objectives: (i) reap the increasing 
returns to be derived from wider cooperation (widening); (ii) push cooperation into new  
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areas,  most  notably  investment  (deepening);  and  (iii)  build  common  institutional 
procedures,  including  dispute  settlement,  that  would  make  commitments  credible 
(legalization).  To  date,  the  proposals  for  a  more  overarching  FTA—whether  a  Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia, or 
an  APT-led  East  Asian  FTA—have  foundered  on  debates  over  membership 
(Yamazawa 2008).  Moreover,  path  dependencies  are  also  starting  to  operate  in  an 
adverse way. With the conclusion of FTA projects between ASEAN and the PRC, Japan, 
and the Republic of Korea, much of the region‘s trade will be covered by FTAs; the 
major outstanding exception is the tremendous gains to be reaped from more robust 
cooperation in Northeast Asia, which is unfortunately tied to developments with respect 
to  the  Democratic  People‘s  Republic  of  Korea  (Haggard  and  Noland  2009).  Yet,  a 
number of very specific features of these agreements pit the interests of insiders against 
outsiders,  including  the  structure  of  phase-in  of  commitments,  rules  of  origin,  and 
accession rules. Rather than paving the way for an overarching agreement, the variety 
of memberships, rules, and decision-making procedures will make these FTAs harder 
rather than easier to reconcile over time.  
 
If the evolution of FTAs has resulted in institutional fragmentation, the emergence of the 
APT seems to signal a new regional focal point. From a purely economic perspective, 
coordination through APEC or a trans-Pacific organization would yield greater gains. The 
ascent of the APT necessarily poses the question of whether the exclusion of the US 
(and of the Western hemisphere more generally) is a temporary development or is likely 
to  become  an  enduring  feature  of  the  regional  institutional  landscape.  Nonetheless, 
there can be little question that the APT currently constitutes the most important locus of 
deepening initiatives.  
 
Moreover, a striking institutional synergy has emerged. Japanese leadership of the ADB 
has permitted it to serve as a de facto secretariat for a number of APT activities, even in 
the absence of formal rules or explicit delegation to that end. A natural question to ask is 
therefore  whether this  cooperation  can  be  extended  to  other  policy  areas,  and  what 
institutional reforms might facilitate it.  
 
With  respect  to  core  decision-making  structures,  it  is  highly  doubtful  that  consensus 
rules would be changed within any of the core institutions in the region (e.g., ASEAN, 
APT, EAS, and APEC). The multilateralization of the CMI shows that the APT is capable 
of delegating to bodies that are governed by qualified majority or weighted voting, but it 
is not clear what—if any—other policy areas would be appropriate for this model.  
   
As  a  result,  more  emphasis  should  be  focused  on  the  structure  and  process  of 
delegation  in  these  institutions:  means  through  which  inter-governmental  bodies  can 
increase the power of supranational ones to generate more robust cooperation.  
 
Compliance Boards and Institutional Assessment Projects 
 
A  common  complaint  is  that  regional  institutions  have  suffered  from  a  deficit  of 
independent  information,  including  information  on  what  both  countries  and  the 
institutions themselves have achieved. ASEAN‘s High Level Task Force on Economic 
Integration recommended the creation of a Compliance Board modeled on the WTO  
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Textile Monitoring Body. The Textiles Monitoring Body is a quasi-judicial standing body 
that  consists  of  a  chairman  and  ten  members  discharging  their  function  on  an  ad 
personam basis and taking all decisions by consensus. The ten members are appointed 
by WTO member governments according to an agreed grouping of WTO members into 
constituencies, but with rotation allowed within the constituencies. The purpose of the 
body is to supervise the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
by examining all measures taken under it and ensuring that they are in conformity with 
the rules. The advantage of this structure is that it overcomes the problem of self-dealing 
in the Osaka Action Plan model; the board has a mandate to focus on violations of 
rules—areas where countries are not in compliance with obligations, rather than areas 
where  they  are  (as  with  the  IAP  model).  The  disadvantage  of  this  model  is  that  it 
replicates  the  inter-governmental  structure  of  existing  regional  arrangements  and 
consensus rules. One way of getting around this would be to constitute  Compliance 
Boards that are tripartite to include government, academic, and business representatives 
for this purpose. This structure would generate more independent policy assessments.  
 
A related problem in assessing the role of international institutions in the region is the 
absence of independent research on whether they are having any effect. This is not 
simply  a  matter  of  showing  compliance  with  commitments,  but  a  deeper  level  of 
evaluation. Is the AFTA changing trade patterns in the region? Are FTAs leading to trade 
diversion? Have trade and investment facilitation agreements actually had the effect of 
reducing transactions costs to the extent claimed? This sort of research goes on within 
the academic community, of course, but there is no means of transmitting it into the 
deliberations of existing institutions. At all levels, from the ASEAN to the APEC, there is 
a need for independent assessment and evaluation that can constitute an input to policy 
deliberations. This can be accomplished in three ways: (i) through economic research 
divisions or units within secretariats (where they exist), or the ADB; (ii) by commissioning 
ad hoc assessment studies; or (iii) through some mix of the two. Equally if not more 
important  is  assuring  that  this  work  is  regularly  summarized  and  presented  before 
decision-making bodies within organizations: the ASEAN Economic Ministers; the APT 
Finance Ministers; and the Senior Officials or Finance Ministers meetings in APEC.  
 
Private Standing in Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
 
A broad dispute settlement mechanism model has emerged from the innovations in the 
WTO process and its modifications. However, the elaborate structure of these systems 
cannot hide the fact that governments continue to act as gatekeepers over the initiation 
of  cases,  and  inter-governmental  processes  with  consensus  biases  subsequently 
influence their disposition. A very simple remedy to this problem exists: grant private 
standing.  Private  agents  have  high-powered  incentives  that  are  missing  in  existing 
arrangements. Given that there is no leverage for such an innovation because of the 
multiplicity of FTAs currently on offer, a first step would at least be to commission a 
study of the modalities of introducing private standing.  
 
Sidepayments: Regional Integration Funds 
 
Finally, and on the most ambitious end of the spectrum, would be the creation of more 
direct linkages between institutional commitments and sidepayments to low-demanding  
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states in order to secure their compliance with policy changes. ECOTECH seeks to build 
capacity  in  the  region  in  specific  areas,  but  does  not  link  capacity  building  to 
commitments (which are in any case non-binding). Similarly, within ASEAN, the IAI and 
lending to the CLMV countries are broadly linked to the integrity of ASEAN, but are not 
tied to particular commitments, for example, in the AFTA or a more ambitious AEC. One 
way of doing this at the ASEAN, APT, or even APEC level would be the creation of 
dedicated Regional Integration Funds that would undertake lending in the context of 
voluntary—but  monitored—commitments  to  accelerate  compliance  with  regional 
commitments.  
 
It is important to close with a reminder of the fundamental limitations of institutional fixes. 
Actors in regional institutions reach agreements not only on substance, but on the rules 
that govern their interactions. Weak rules may well reflect underlying preferences. In the 
absence of a willingness to undertake binding commitments, it is misguided to think that 
changing institutions will matter much; to the contrary, institutions might even weaken if 
expectations are raised only to be dashed, as has happened so frequently in ASEAN 
and APEC already. However, preferences are not fixed. Providing better information and 
incentives  for  making  compromises  is  something  that  institutions  can  and  should  be 
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